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Abstract 
The question of Beauvoir’s relationship to Hegel is at the forefront of Beauvoir scholarship. 
Research until now has proceeded on the assumption that the relationship’s dominant feature 
is Kojève’s reading of the master-slave dialectic. I will argue that Beauvoir’s relationship to 
Hegel is more sophisticated than so far suggested largely because it is not sufficient to read 
her use of Hegel only in these narrow terms. This paper will argue that Beauvoir’s 
Hegelianism is at least as mediated by Bataille: to understand Beauvoir’s use of the term 
‘sovereign’ we must avoid reading it as a mere synonym for ‘master’ but must also take 
Bataille’s use of the term into account. This paper will focus on Bataille’s ontology, his 
concept of sovereignty, and his presence in the Ethics of Ambiguity. It will develop this 
reading in the context of The Second Sex and of Beauvoir’s analysis of woman as Other. This 
paper will argue that central to Beauvoir’s understanding of sexual difference is a notion of 
the heterogeneous being of woman vis-à-vis the unified being of man. 
Introduction 
The term ‘sovereign’, especially in the context of ‘the sovereign subject (sujet 
souverain)’, is certainly one of the core concepts in Beauvoir’s oeuvre and in The Second 
Sex. This is particularly the case insofar as it is presupposed by the idea of ‘the other’.1 In The 
Second Sex the term is used in at least four interconnected ways. First, Beauvoir equates 
sovereignty with masculinity arguing that for contemporary society it is all but axiomatic that 
‘man is sovereign in this world [...] woman [is] only an object’.2 The term is, second, used in 
feudal terms to denote the person of the king or queen, as someone who is sovereign over a 
particular domain.3 It is in this sense that Beauvoir can speak of a woman as sovereign in the 
                                                 
1 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New York: 
Alfred A Knopf, 2010 [1949]), 6. (Hereafter cited as TSS.) 
2 TSS, 387. 
3 TSS, 115, 117-8, 150, 423. 
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home.4 Third, the term denotes the divine.5 And fourth, and arguably foundationally, the term 
is used as a synonym for the master of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic: the dialectical pair is 
sometimes referred to by Beauvoir as the ‘sovereign and slave (la souveraine et l’esclave)’.6 
For philosophical commentary on the text this fourth usage has been taken as the most 
significant; the importance of Hegel to the philosophy of Beauvoir has been well recognized.7 
The secondary literature is united in the view that Beauvoir appropriates Hegel’s master-slave 
dialectic though it has settled on neither the exact nature of this appropriation nor on the 
manner in which she moves to critique him.8 Along with the question of her relationship to 
Sartre, the question of Beauvoir’s relationship to Hegel has been at the forefront of Beauvoir 
scholarship for the past twenty years: the two issues are of course interrelated.9 We may note 
texts by Eva Lundgren-Gothlin, Nancy Bauer, and more recently Karen Green and Nicholas 
Roffey.10 Almost all who so far have added to the exegetical debate share a common 
presupposition: Beauvoir’s Hegelianism is that of the master-slave dialectic.11 
Such understandings of the centrality of the master-slave dialectic are not limited to 
Beauvoir scholarship. It widely held that the most significant figure in the tradition of French 
Hegelianism is Alexandre Kojève whose lectures at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes 
from 1933 to 1939, just before the first French translation of the Phenomenology, are 
believed to have initiated an entire generation into the reading of Hegel.12 Kojève’s Hegel is 
grounded in a specifically anthropological reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit and makes 
central the master-slave dialectic. (Jean Hyppolite plays a supporting role in this 
                                                 
4 TSS, 513  
5 TSS, 641. This is particularly evident in the chapter ‘The Mystic’ where Beauvoir discusses the mystical 
devotion to ‘God himself’ TSS 709-717. 
6 TSS, 429; Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), Vol 2:206. (Hereafter cited as 
LDS.) See also the introduction to the section: ‘Myths’ TSS, 159; LDS, 1:240. 
7 Meryl Altman, ‘Beauvoir, Hegel, War’, Hypatia 22, no. 3 (2007): 66-7. See also 71-2. 
8 Karen Green and Nicholas Roffey, ‘Women, Hegel, and Recognition in The Second Sex’, Hypatia 25, no. 2 
(2010): 382. 
9 Ibid.: 376. 
10 Nancy Bauer, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy & and Feminism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2001); Karen Green and Nicholas Roffey, ‘Women, Hegel, and Recognition in The Second Sex’; Eva 
Lundgren-Gothlin, Sex and Existence: Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex (London: Athlone, 1996). 
11 An important exception to this is the paper by Altman who notes the dominance of Kojève in understanding 
Beauvoir’s Hegelianism and provides significant evidence to show that this is a misreading of Beauvoir’s 
philosophical development. Altman, ‘Beauvoir, Hegel, War’. 
12 Bruce Baugh, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism (New York & Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), 
1. The first French translation of the Phenomenology of Sprit was done by Jean Hyppolite and published in 
1939. See also: Stefanos Geroulanos, An Atheism that Is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought Cultural 
Memory in the Present (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2010), 133. 
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understanding.) The French Hegel has effectively become Kojève’s Hegel and become that of 
the master-slave dialectic. And so for Lundgren-Gothlin: ‘like Kojève and Hyppolite, 
Beauvoir was primarily interested in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and, like Kojève, mainly 
in the master-slave dialectic’.13 Bauer follows this lead.14 Yet significantly, the extent of 
scholarly interest in Beauvoir’s Hegelianism stems from the fact that she neither simply nor 
mechanically applies the master-slave dialectic to the plight of man and woman: Lundgren-
Gothlin argues convincingly that Beauvoir does not merely equate woman with the slave, and 
Bauer adds that ‘the man [...cannot] be located within the terms of Hegel’s dialectic any more 
easily than the woman can’.15 There is today no doubt that Beauvoir is an original and 
independent thinker and her appropriation of other philosophers is always productive and 
often critical in ways not immediately apparent.16 Yet the lack of consensus on Beauvoir’s 
relationship to Hegel may well be an indication that a piece of the puzzle is missing; neither 
Lundgren-Gothlin, Bauer, nor Green and Roffey take the lack of fit between Hegel’s master-
slave dialectic and Beauvoir’s analysis of the relationship between man and woman as an 
invitation to read Beauvoir’s Hegelianism more broadly than in terms of a narrowly 
understood Kojèvian master-slave dialectic. 
There are good reasons to suppose that the place of Kojève in French Hegelianism has 
been overemphasized and/or oversimplified. Bruce Baugh argues that ‘the grandiose claim 
that Kojève effectively initiated an entire generation [...] into the Hegelian mysteries [...] 
cannot be maintained’.17 Baugh’s study focuses on the older and conceptually primary 
tradition of reading Hegel: older, as the tradition started with Jean Wahl’s (1929) Le malheur 
de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel;18 more primary, as the unhappy 
consciousness is a ‘phase of the development of the freedom of self-consciousness that 
follows the stages of master and slave, stoicism, and skepticism’, and therefore subsumes the 
                                                 
13 Lundgren-Gothlin, Sex and Existence: Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex, 59. See too, p 67. 
14 Bauer, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy & and Feminism 138 & 175. See to Zeynep Direk’s paper on Bataille 
and Beauvoir. Direk maintains a focus on the master-slave dialectic and maintains the (simplistic, 
anthropological) idea that Beauvoir’s understanding of Hegel is mediated by Kojève: Zeynep Direk, 
‘Immanence and Abjection in Simone de Beauvoir’, The Southern Journal of Philosopy 49, no. 1 (2011): 55, 
57, 59, &70.  
15 Bauer, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy & and Feminism, 182; see also 177-8 & 191-6. See also: Green and 
Roffey, ‘Women, Hegel, and Recognition in The Second Sex’. 
16 See: Margaret Simons, ‘Confronting an Impasse: Reflections on the Past and Future of Beauvoir Scholarship’, 
Hypatia 25, no. 4 (2010). See also: Penelope Deutscher, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir, Ideas in 
Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 12.  
17 Baugh, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism, 1. See also: Altman, ‘Beauvoir, Hegel, War’. 
18 Baugh, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism, 1-7. 
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master-slave dialectic.19 Significantly then Hegelianism which makes primary unhappy 
consciousness will include the master-slave dialectic but only as one aspect.20 Beauvoir read 
the Phenomenology during the Nazi occupation of Paris.21 But this was not her first exposure 
to Hegelianism, she read Wahl’s book in 1929 and used it to help her read the 
Phenomenology.22 Further Beauvoir wrote that neither she nor Sartre attended nor were 
influenced by Kojève’s lectures.23 There are then reasons to think that Beauvoir’s Hegel was 
not as influenced by Kojève as commentators have generally assumed. 
For his part Stefanos Geroulanos argues that Kojève’s influence has been 
oversimplified though not overemphasised. For this paper the pertinent point is that 
contemporary commentary relies heavily on Raymond Queneau’s heavily edited version of 
Kojève’s lectures while overlooking Kojève’s extensive extant lecture notes and other 
published writings.24 For Geroulanos, Kojève’s reading of Hegel was in fact influential in 
three aspects, not one: of course his treatment of the master-slave dialectic, but also his 
thematisation of time, and for his obsession of the end of history around Napoleon and/or 
Stalin.25 This last point was Kojève’s major contribution to the emergence of a French 
atheistic anti-humanism; once again the point is not that the master-slave dialectic is 
unimportant, but rather that French Hegelianism is not reducible to just this one aspect. 
Pursuing these ideas I want to begin with two very simple observations: First, Hegel, 
and Kojève after him, are interested in the master-slave dialectic, so Beauvoir’s tendency to 
use the term ‘sovereign’ as a synonym for ‘master’ is already a move away from them. And 
‘sovereignty’ is not a major concept in Hegel (nor in Sartre).26 However from the 1930s 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 3. 
20 Beauvoir explicitly uses the phrase ‘unhappy consciousness:’ TSS, 159. The Ethics’ major reference to the 
master-slave dialectic occurs within the specific context of a discussion of Hegel’s ethics but only constitutes 
one of about sixteen references to Hegel (by proper name): Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity 
(New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 1976 [1947]), 104. (Hereafter cited as EA.) For his part Bataille 
does make explicit reference to the master-slave dialectic and of its importance in Kojève’s reading of Hegel. 
See: Georges Bataille, Inner Experiance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988 [1943]), 109. 
(Hereafter cited as IE.) 
21 Altman, ‘Beauvoir, Hegel, War’, 68. 
22 Ibid.: 71-2. 
23 In: Christopher Fry, Sartre and Hegel: The Variations of an Enigma (Bonne: Bouvier, 1988), 5.  
24 Geroulanos, An Atheism that Is Not Humanist, 135. 
25 Ibid., 133.  
26 For example, the term is not a covered in: Michael Inwood, ed. A Hegel Dictionary (Blackwell Publishing, 
Blackwell Reference Online. 23 February 2011 
<http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9780631175339_chunk_g978063117533923>,
1992). And it is not mentioned in Gary Cox, The Sartre Dictionary (London & New York: Continuum, 2008). 
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onwards, the term is a major pillar of the thought of Georges Bataille.27 Second, in 
Beauvoir’s oeuvre the term ‘sovereign’ has a place before the introduction of The Second 
Sex. As I will show, it is a significant term in the Ethics of Ambiguity and its usage there is 
not tied to the master-salve dialectic, but rather to Hegelianism more broadly including to 
Bataille’s Hegel. 
It will be my argument that Beauvoir’s Hegelianism is at least as mediated by the 
tradition of French anti-humanism which leads from Hegel, through Kojève, into Bataille (the 
third aspect of Kojève’s influence that Geroulanos identifies) as it is by Kojève’s 
anthropological interpretation of Hegel centering on the master-slave dialectic (the first 
aspect of Kojève’s influence). I will not argue that Hegel’s master-salve dialectic is 
unimportant for Beauvoir; on the contrary she saw it as being of great importance as did 
Bataille.28 Rather I argue that understandings of Beauvoir’s Hegelianism are incomplete if 
they do not include the Kojèvian theme of homogeneity and particularly Bataille’s response 
in his theories of heterogeneity and sovereignty.29 This paper will examine Beauvoir’s use of 
and response to Bataille: it will only examine Bataille’s or Beauvoir’s substantive 
relationships to either Hegel or Kojève in order to serve this purpose.30 The first section will 
focus on Bataille’s ontology, his concept of sovereignty, and his presence in the Ethics. The 
second section will develop this reading in the context of The Second Sex, specifically 
showing that central to Beauvoir’s understanding of sexual difference is the idea of the 
heterogeneous being of women vis-à-vis the unified being of men. 
I Bataille, Sovereignty, and The Ethics of Ambiguity  
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948) is a significant though under-read text for the history 
of French theory. It underpins Beauvoir’s more famous The Second Sex, particularly the 
                                                 
27 Especially, but not exclusively in: Georges Bataille, "The Psychological Structure of Fascism," in Visions of 
Excess: Selected Writings of, 1927-1939, ed. Allen Stoekl, Theory and History of Litrature (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1985 [1933-4]). (Hereafter cited as PSF.) This paper will not refer to Bataille’s 
major work on the topic the posthumously published La souveraineté because it was published too late to 
have influenced either The Ethics of Ambiguity or The Second Sex: see Georges Bataille, ‘Soverignty’, in The 
Accursed Share: Volumes 2 & 3 (New York: Zone Books, 1993 [1976]). 
28 Christopher M. Gemerchak, The Sunday of the Negative: Reading Bataille Reading Hegel (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2003), 41-2. 
29 I am not the first person to notice the significance of Bataille for Beauvoir. Zeynep Direk has recently used 
Bataille to read the relation between immanence and abjection in Beauvoir. Direk, ‘Immanence and Abjection 
in Simone de Beauvoir’. 
30 On Bataille’s direct relationship to Hegel see: Jim Vernon, ‘Homogeneity and Heterogeneity: Bataille and 
Hegel’, Canadian Philosophical Association / Association canadienne de philosophie 43(2004); Baugh, 
French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism, 71-92.; Gemerchak, The Sunday of the Negative: Reading 
Bataille Reading Hegel.  
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famously brief gestures she makes there toward the possibility of authentic relationships in 
which woman can ‘reconquer her dignity as transcendent and free subject while assuming her 
carnal condition’.31 The Ethics is a complex text. The terms of its ontology of the subject are 
well known: the subject is ambiguous. As intentional consciousness the subject is comprised 
of two moments, one that discloses being, the other that identifies the disclosing ‘I’ with the 
being it discloses; the first is a moment of revelation, the second of appropriation; the mood 
of the first is joyful and wondrous, the mood of the second is anxious and assertive. The two 
modes contest each other but are bound to each other. The first moment echoes Husserl and, 
though the text does not mention him by name, Merleau-Ponty; the second Hegel and Sartre. 
Ultimately for Beauvoir, the desire to disclose being succeeds; the desire to be fails. Though 
the Ethics finds no equilibrium it does privilege the first moment, locating ethics in 
affirmation of the joy of freedom, and of the other and their freedom.32  
The text can be read in terms which are more or less Sartrean but it is open to other 
voices. A key marker of this openness is Beauvoir’s use of the term ‘sovereign’. She uses it 
twice in the first three pages without precisely indicating how she understands it; ‘sovereign 
being’, here juxtaposed with the being of objects, is equated with consciousness.33 One page 
later she equates sovereignty with freedom over servitude, significance over insignificance, 
and ends over means.34 It is tempting to read this as a reference to Hegel’s master and there 
are certainly strong grounds for this.35 But importantly Beauvoir herself does not actually do 
so. Rather, in France from the 1930s onwards, the term ‘sovereign’ is a major pillar of 
                                                 
31 TSS, 416. 
32 EA, 12. See also 23. See also: Debra B. Bergoffen, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Gendered 
Phenomenologies, Erotic Generosities (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), 76-9; Eva 
Lundgren-Gothlin, ‘Simone de Beauvoir's Notions of Appeal, Desire, and Ambiguity and their Relationship to 
Jean-Paul Sartre's Notions of Appeal and Desire’, Hypatia 14, no. 4 (1999): 84. 
33 EA, 7.  
34 EA, 8-9. 
35 On the extent to which Hegel’s ‘master’ and Bataille’s ‘sovereign’ are equivalent terms see: Gemerchak, The 
Sunday of the Negative, 44-49. While Gemerchack does initially presume a basic equivalence he also notes 
that the terms are not exact and notes various ways in which Bataille term usurps or inverts Hegel’s. 
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Bataille’s thought and I do not think Beauvoir’s use of the term is incidental.36 The Ethics 
mentions Bataille by name twice, once specifically naming his 1943 Inner Experience.37 
Bataille is a difficult figure to locate in the broader movements of twentieth-century 
theory. This is partly due to the changing mood of his oeuvre even if the change in content is 
not great. Bataille had an intimate and antagonistic relationship with the surrealists and it is 
tempting to read him in these terms. However many of his writings are best considered in 
terms of a mystical tradition which leads to him from Pascal, through Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche. (The tradition of existentialist responses to Hegel, specifically in Kierkegaard, is 
one with which Beauvoir associates herself.38) These writings tend to be highly stylized: 
autobiographical, gnomic, aphoristic; they are often esoteric and presume the reader is an 
initiate. This work is best understood as a version of existential (a-)theology. By contrast 
others of his works are sociological in the tradition of Durkheim.39 (A tradition too within 
which Beauvoir is working.) Less recondite, they are more transparently theoretical. In works 
such as Literature and Evil his writing is most easily understood as literary critique. And then 
there is his literary pornography. Bataille’s influence on post-structuralism has been much 
written about (and perhaps overstated); he has been described as a ‘rope linking 1930s 
radicalism to that of the 1960s’.40 
There are at least two ways to understand the relationship between Beauvoir and 
Bataille. First, given that they knew each other, moved in the same social and intellectual 
circles, and had read each other’s work, we may understand their relationship as one 
governed by specific interactions. Bataille was slightly older than Beauvoir but not by 
much.41 Both were active figures in the French intellectual left and Sartre was an open, if 
                                                 
36 Especially, but not exclusively: PSF. See also: Bataille, ‘Soverignty’. For her part Zeynep Direk traces the 
relationship between Bataille and Beauvoir in terms of immanence not, as I am doing here, in terms of 
sovereignty. She argues that ‘Bataille is the fundamental thinker of Hegelian immanence on the French 
scene.’ (p 54, See also p 71)  She defines ‘immanence [as] the flow between the living body and its environing 
outside.’ (p 65) It is worth nothing the proximity between her reading of immanence and the reading of 
heterogeneous being which I will develop in this paper; the concepts are highly proximate without being 
identical. Direk, ‘Immanence and Abjection in Simone de Beauvoir’. 
37 EA, 70 &126.  
38 EA, 9.  
39 Michel Surya, Georges Bataille: An Intellectual Biography, trans. Krzysztof Fijalkowski and Michael 
Richardson (London and New York: Verso, 2002), 178.  
40 Baugh, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism, 71. See also: Gemerchak, The Sunday of the 
Negative, 9. 
41 Bataille (1897 –1962); Beauvoir (1908 –1986). 
  
 
     8    
ungenerous, critic of Bataille.42 That they were knowledgeable about each other’s writings is 
testified to by overt references in their work. Second, and more generally, they were products 
of a very similar intellectual milieu and so shared common influences. Two are worth 
mentioning. First, French anthropology and sociology including such figures as Durkheim, 
Mauss, and Levi-Strauss.43 More on this influence ought to be written however this paper 
will limit itself to the second common influence, French Hegelianism and the emerging 
tradition of French atheist anti-humanism.44 Kojève looms large here.45 But rather than 
tracing in detail these specific interactions or common influences this paper will focus on the 
thematic continuities, including the specific disagreements, which exist between the two 
oeuvres and will argue that given the close historical proximity between them these thematic 
continuities cannot be accidental. 
This paper will focus on Bataille’s ontology and on its relationship to Beauvoir’s 
existential phenomenology. Care needs to be taken in reading Bataille in terms of 
phenomenology.46 While he does consider that phenomenology is ‘the only philosophy which 
lives’, he distances himself from it on the grounds that phenomenology places too heavy an 
emphasis on the epistemological value of experience ‘not understand[ing] that the limit as the 
goal of knowledge, needs to be crossed’.47 Accordingly, Bataille specifically distances 
himself from Hegelian phenomenology because it ‘represents the mind as essentially 
homogeneous’.48 I will here consider Bataille’s relationship with existential phenomenology; 
I will not consider him as a phenomenologist. Bataille certainly is not a transcendental 
phenomenologist in the sense of Husserl: while he does privilege experience in an existential 
                                                 
42 Baugh, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism, 91. See: Direk, ‘Immanence and Abjection in 
Simone de Beauvoir’, 66. 
43 On Levi-Strauss’s interaction with Beauvoir see: TSS 6-7, 80-1; Toril Moi, Simone de Beauvoir: The Making 
of an Intellectual Woman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 209; Penelope Deutscher, The Philosophy 
of Simone de Beauvoir: Ambiguity, Conversion, Resistance, Ideas in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 12-16, 41, 161. See also: Denis Hollier, ed. The College of Sociology (1937-39), 
Theory and History of Literature, Vol 41 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1988), xv; Surya, 
Georges Bataille: An Intellectual Biography, 177 & 269. 
44 Geroulanos, An Atheism that Is Not Humanist. 
45 On Kojève as an influence on Bataille and on Kojève as mediator between Hegel and Bataille, see: 
Gemerchak, The Sunday of the Negative, 4 &12. Bataille attended Kojeve’s lectures, they were life-long 
friends Surya, see: Georges Bataille: An Intellectual Biography, 188-90. 
46 See: IE, 8. 
47 IE, 8.  
48 Georges Bataille, ‘Attraction and Repulsion II: Social Structure’, in The College of Sociology (1937-39), ed. 
Denis Hollier, Theory and History of Literature, Vol 41 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 
117.  
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sense, Bataille does not privilege consciousness, or have in his thought an equivalent of the 
transcendental ego. There is less concern in reading Bataille as an ontologist. There is a 
fundamental ontology underpinning his project and there are moments in his writing where 
this is made explicit.49 I want to make this clear: Bataille does have an ontology of the subject 
and this paper will take some care to reconstruct it and show Beauvoir’s use of it; he does not 
however privilege the singular conscious subject within his ontology, rather his 
preoccupation is with an ontology of complex beings. 
It is possible, Bataille wrote, ‘to consider the conglomeration – town, city, or village – 
as the fundamental element of human society’.50 Such an element is a composite or complex 
being and significantly has the same ontological status as an individual human being, or as 
‘inert corpuscles’, beehives, or cosmic entities such as stars.51 Consciousness, which is for 
Bataille always divisible, also has complex being and can equally be a property of societies as 
of the individual.52 It was the study of society in these terms, and the means by which 
societies were brought together, which was the focus of the Collège de Sociologie (1937-39), 
a research group formed by Bataille in consultation with Roger Caillois and Michel Leiris.53 
(Kojève was associated with the group but he was not a member and was somewhat distant 
from its core interests. Jean Wahl was also involved.54) For the Collège, what holds societies 
together is the scared – that is to say the taboo – object at the centre: the ‘social nucleus’.55 
                                                 
49 See ‘The Labyrinth (or The Constitution of Beings)’ IE, 81-93. This is a version of an earlier publication: 
Georges Bataille, ‘The Labyrinth’, in Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 1927-1939, ed. Allen Stoekl 
(Minneapolis: Universtiy of Minnesota Press, 1985 [1935-6]). ; see also: Georges Bataille, ‘Sacred Sociology 
and the Relationships between “Society”, “Organism”, and “Being”’, in The College of Sociology (1937-39), 
ed. Denis Hollier, Theory and History of Literature, Vol 41 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988), 74. 
50 Georges Bataille, ‘Power,’ in The College of Sociology (1937-39), ed. Denis Hollier, Theory and History of 
Literature, Vol 41 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 127. 
51 Georges Bataille, ‘The College of Sociology’, in The College of Sociology (1937-39), ed. Denis Hollier, 
p.336.; see also Bataille, ‘Sacred Sociology and the Relationships between “Society”, “Organism”, and 
“Being”’, 75-79; Georges Bataille, "Attraction and Repulsion I: Tropisms, Sexuality, Laughter and Tears," in 
The College of Sociology (1937-39), ed. Denis Hollier, p.104-5. 
52 Bataille, ‘Sacred Sociology and the Relationships between “Society”, “Organism”, and “Being”’, 79-80. 
53 See: Surya, Georges Bataille: An Intellectual Biography, 261-70; Roger Caillois in, The College of Sociology 
(1937-39), ed. Denis Hollier, 10. 
54 Surya, Georges Bataille: An Intellectual Biography, 237 & 262; Hollier in, The College of Sociology (1937-
39), ed. Denis Hollier, xi & 12-13. See also Roger Caillois in The College of Sociology (1937-39), ed. Denis 
Hollier, 9-11; Gemerchak, The Sunday of the Negative, 10. 
55 Bataille, ‘Attraction and Repulsion I’, 105 & 6. See also: Gemerchak, The Sunday of the Negative: Reading 
Bataille Reading Hegel, 2. 
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The social nucleus is, in fact, taboo, that is to say, untouchable and unspeakable [...] 
Everything leads us to believe that early human beings were brought together by disgust and 
by common terror, by an insurmountable horror focused precisely on what originally was the 
central attraction of their union.56 
Nothing is more important for us than that we recognise that we are bound and sworn to that 
which horrifies us most, that which provokes our most intense disgust.57 
Perhaps the key feature of taboo for Bataille, and this is significant for his theory of 
sovereignty, is that: 
[It] consists essentially in the expulsion of certain objects into a region that is impossible to 
penetrate. These objects have, if you will, the power to send away, or at least keep at a 
distance, all the individuals who participate in the institution. That is, in essence, not a case of 
objects consecrated by beliefs or fixed rituals – it is corpses, blood, especially menstrual 
blood, menstruating women themselves. […] These objects, […] are impure and untouchable, 
and they are sacred.58 
This quote, and particularly its positioning of women as taboo, introduces themes which will 
be central to The Second Sex and to the second part of this paper. Significantly for Bataille 
the feudal lord or king – the sovereign in a political sense – is taboo. So too is the divine.59 It 
is their exclusion from the group or society which allows them to be the guarantor of the 
order of things.60 Sovereign power amalgamates the disparate elements through the 
imposition of unity;61 it unifies through exclusion, an act which creates the homogeneity by 
which it gains power.62 
There is much here which Bataille drew from his intellectual context: specifically, he 
is adapting from Kojève the notion of homogeneity.63 For Kojève ‘something is homogenous 
when the differences between its parts are not such as to form self-sufficient totalities of their 
own.’64 Eventually for his interpretation of Hegel, the process of history leads to a ‘universal 
                                                 
56 Bataille, ‘Attraction and Repulsion I’, 106. 
57 Bataille ‘Attraction and Repulsion II’, 114. 
58 Ibid., 121. 
59 IE, 87; PSF, 142 & 153.   
60 Bataille ‘Power’ in The College of Sociology (1937-39), ed. Denis Hollier, 128 & 130; IE, 87. 
61 PSF, 143.  
62 PSF, 147.  
63 Especially from Kojève’s L’Athéisme (1931). On the degree to which Kojève’s notion of homogeneity is a 
distancing from Hegel see: Geroulanos, An Atheism that Is Not Humanist, 141-2. 
64 Ibid., 142. 
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homogeneous state, in which all citizens are satisfied, [and which] is also the world that no 
one can manage to overcome’.65 This is Kojève’s famous ‘end of history’.66 Bataille’s 
response to this totality is broadly Nietzschian.67 He affirms heterogeneity against totalising 
homogeneity; Bataille’s ‘heterology would be the theory of that which theory expels’.68 
Heterology theorises the process of exclusion without reducing it to the included: laughing, 
vomiting, shitting, and so on.69 And dying which is for Bataille ‘the main limit to 
homogenous existence’.70 
To say that taboo or sacred objects are ‘untouchable and unspeakable’ is also to say 
that they are unthinkable.71 Bataille’s Heterology operates against philosophy (the 
Kojèvian/Hegelian ‘system’) avoiding subsuming the objects of his study to rationality.72 
Sovereignty then has a fundamentally paradoxical or ‘prediscursive’ nature.73 The sovereign 
too represents the irrational which constrains, and thereby creates, the rational.74 Or in 
ontological terms: For Hegel indeterminate ‘being’, being which is undetermined by any 
structure so as to make it a particular or a class, is meaningful only in opposition to ‘nothing’. 
That is, ‘being’ is grasped only in terms of its negation. So, on the one hand while ‘being’ 
and ‘nothing’ seem distinct and opposed, on the other they appear the same; no criterion can 
differentiate them.75 This idea is fundamental for Bataille though he is far too original a 
thinker to mechanically adopt it without making it his own. So while for Hegel being remains 
irreducible to if indistinguishable from nothingness, for Bataille it does not, absolute Being is 
nothingness: ‘being is nowhere;’76 ‘absolute knowledge is definitive non-knowledge’;77 
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Life will dissolve itself [va se perdre] in death, rivers in the sea, and the known in the 
unknown. Knowledge is access to the unknown. Nonsense is the outcome of every possible 
sense.78 
Sovereignty then ought to be understood as one of a cluster of concepts which all operate in 
fundamentally the same way and which are all, at least ontologically, largely interchangeable. 
The summit, often the summit of a pyramid which represents the constitution of society or of 
individual beings, is a visual/spatial metaphor;79 sovereignty is the overtly political or 
anthropological metaphor;80 God, the religious metaphor; knowledge, the epistemological 
metaphor. These all represent absolute Being; but of course Being is nothing or nowhere for 
Bataille: they are all paradoxical concepts.81 
To ask then after Bataille’s ontology, specifically his ontology of the subject, is to 
invite a terse response: there is no subject in Bataille; or in any event his concept of the 
subject leans in the direction of being oxymoronic. A subject is a singular person or thing; 
‘heterogeneous subjectivity’ is a contradiction in terms. ‘MAN IS A PARTICLE INSERTED 
IN UNSTABLE AND TANGLED GROUPS [...] Being is always a group of particles whose 
relative autonomies are maintained’.82 Complex beings – human beings, machines, bee hives, 
etc – lack autonomy, but desire it.83 What there is for Bataille is the desire for autonomy and 
for being, a desire Bataille associates with ‘the sickness of being’.84 This is Bataille’s 
fundamental vitalism, his adaption of Nietzsche’s will to power. This is characterized by 
Bataille as the desire for sovereignty or mastery and as an ascent to the summit.85 That is, for 
Bataille the movements of inclusion and exclusion need to be understood identically for all 
complex beings: in individual terms the subject is sovereign insofar as it is heterogeneous; it 
is homogenous insofar as it is unified.86 
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& 83. 
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The exclusion of heterogeneous elements from the homogeneous realm of consciousness 
formally recalls the exclusion of the elements, described (by psychoanalysis) as unconscious, 
which censorship excludes from the conscious ego [moi conscient].87  
Taboo and repression are mechanisms of the exclusion of the heterogeneous from the 
homogeneous realm of consciousness.88 And eroticism, par excellence, is a matter of taboo 
and transgression; much of Bataille’s studies of eroticism consist of a study of ‘the 
complementary relationship uniting taboos which reject violence, with acts of transgression 
which set it free. These counterbalanced urges have a kind of unity’89; ‘transgression does not 
deny the taboo but transcends it and completes it’.90 In a static ontology – an ontology which 
describes what things themselves are – Bataille’s terms are hard to keep hold of; they are 
much easier to grasp when they are understood in terms of actions, becoming, or processes: 
that is, in terms of change, particularly of the processes of desire and dissolution. This 
process then is Bataille’s theory of sovereignty; ontologically, sovereignty remains both all 
and nothing.91 
There are two important but somewhat parenthetical points I would like to make 
before turning to Beauvoir’s response to Bataille. First, process too is a feature of Beauvoir’s 
ontology which is heavily inflected by the process of becoming a sovereign subject or of 
renouncing the project of attaining being. This constitutes one of the major differences 
between her and the broader phenomenological tradition. Second, both Beauvoir and Bataille 
are significant exegetes of Sade: Beauvoir in her famous 1951/2 essay;92 Bataille from the 
1930s and particularly in his 1957 writings.93 For both interpretations the notion of 
sovereignty is significant: they both locate in Sade and his oeuvre the idea of the unique 
sovereign subject and its critique. 
The term ‘sovereignty’ is then common to both Bataille and Beauvoir though of 
course in detail their use of it and the ontologies which underpin it are far from identical. The 
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relationship here is complex but I think there is sufficient textual evidence to allow us to read 
Beauvoir as responding to Bataille (and through him to Kojève/Hegel) particularly in terms 
of the paradox of Bataille’s subject. Bataille’s subject lacks autonomy and so is a complex, is 
groundless and so lacks being; presupposing this, Beauvoir’s subject wills itself into being 
and into ethical life. 
Beauvoir’s first nominal reference to Bataille (in fact to Bataille/Hegel) is in the 
context of endorsing his notion of the desire for being. 
In the preface to The Inner Experience Georges Bataille emphasizes very forcefully that each 
individual wants to be All [Tout]. He sees in every other man and particularly in those whose 
existence is asserted with the most brilliance, a limit, a condemnation of himself. ‘Each 
consciousness’, said Hegel, ‘seeks the death of the other’. And indeed at every moment others 
[autrui] are stealing the whole world away from me. The first movement is to hate them. But 
this hatred is naive, and the desire [l’envie] immediately struggles against itself. If I were 
really everything there would be nothing besides me; the world would be empty. There would 
be nothing to possess, and I would be nothing.94 
While this is in several sentences a narrow reference to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic it is so 
in within a broader reference to Bataille’s ontological problematic. Bataille analyses the 
desire of all beings for Being, not just the desire of one transcendent consciousness for 
recognition by another; for Bataille the question of sovereignty is posed in terms of 
heterogeneity and homogeneity, not just in terms of conflict with another consciousness.95 
For her part, Beauvoir’s understanding of the subject is founded on concepts which 
parallel those of Bataille. This is especially the case for the individual’s relationship to 
society and of being’s relationship to nothingness. Here Beauvoir poses the Bataille/Hegel 
dilemma as a background to her express solution: 
If the individual is nothing, society can not be something. Take his substance away from him, 
and the State has no more substance; if he has nothing to sacrifice, there is nothing before him 
to sacrifice to. Hegelian fullness immediately passes into the nothingness [néant] of absence. 
And the very grandeur of that failure makes his truth shine forth: only the subject can justify 
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his own existence; no external subject [sujet étranger], no object can bring him salvation from 
the outside.96 
The ethical component of Beauvoir’s work, her production of a substantive grounded subject 
from within this ontology of complex beings, is made up of two complementary moments. 
Firstly, she calls on the subject to will itself as ambiguous and to choose itself as free, to 
ground itself in an act of willing. This involves a renunciation of the desire to attain being.97  
To attain his truth, man must not attempt to dispel the ambiguity of his being but, on the 
contrary, accept the task of realizing it. He rejoins himself only to the extent that he agrees to 
remain at a distance from himself.98 
Secondly, and simultaneously, the subject must will the freedom of others: ‘man can find a 
justification of his own existence only in the existence of other men;’99 ‘to will oneself free is 
also to will others free;’100 ‘to will man free is to will there to be being; it is to will the 
disclosure of being in the joy of existence’.101 
II The Second Sex: Woman as Heterogeneous Other 
I want to now turn to The Second Sex (1949) and show the implications of Beauvoir’s 
use of Bataille in her chef d’oeuvre, to show the importance for Beauvoir scholarship of 
reading her with Bataille, and to foreground aspects of the text which have not yet received 
much critical attention. One of the ways Beauvoir understands woman to be other is in terms 
of their having heterogeneous being vis-à-vis men’s unified being. 
Beauvoir’s appropriation of Bataille’s ontology is in the first instance evident in her 
version of the emergence of civil society from the ‘primitive hordes’.102 
Many tribes live under a communal regime [...] but men and woman only have a religious, 
social, and economic existence as a group: their individuality remains a purely biological fact; 
[…] The clan as a whole, gathered under the same totem, mystically shares the same mana 
[mana] and materially shares the common enjoyment of a territory […] the clan grasps itself 
in this territory in the guise of an objective and concrete figure; through the permanence of 
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the land, the clan thus realizes itself as a unity whose identity persists throughout the passage 
of time.103 
Recall that for Bataille the individual gains access to the universal through social groups, and 
through a sovereign or a god which amalgamates the disparate elements of the group and 
thereby gains its power.104 And so for Beauvoir the tribe is united – it ‘encounters its own 
alienated existence’ – by its totem and its territory. The subject’s individualism remains for 
her purely biological. 
[The subject] felt lost in nature and in the group, passive, threatened, the plaything of obscure 
forces; it was only in identifying the whole clan that he dared to think of himself: the totem, 
the mana, and the earth were collective realities.105  
Significantly, this is the condition in which woman will remain. Not so for man who with the 
‘discovery of bronze’ begins to ‘grasp himself as autonomous activity and to accomplish 
himself in his singularity [singularité]’.106 ‘When the individual separates from the 
community, he demands a singular embodiment [incarnation singulière]: the mana is 
individualized in the chief, then in the individual’.107 
The parallel with Bataille’s ontology is stark. The subject is neither heterogeneous nor 
homogeneous per se, but is so only relative to others: a unified subject may also provide the 
unifying power of a group and so be external to it (i.e. heterogeneous). And so Beauvoir 
understands the sovereign to be one who imposes unity or wholeness (and so is itself 
heterogeneous) while also understanding of the sovereign as himself unified or singular 
(homogeneous). Note however that for Bataille the abject is heterogeneous and also 
sovereign, for Beauvoir abjection (and immanence) remains associated with heterogeneity 
but is not linked to sovereignty, singularity, or masculinity.108 
For Beauvoir individual unity is linked to the emergence of private property. Reading 
Beauvoir with Bataille, we see that it is through the advent of private property that individual 
men attain the sovereignty previously held only by the totem or chief. It is in unifying 
property (the owner imposes unity on otherwise diverse things) that man becomes sovereign. 
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Owning nothing, women do not attain individuality or singularity but contribute rather to the 
sovereignty of her father or husband.109  
Once woman is dethroned by the advent of private property, her fate is linked to it for 
centuries […] The fundamental importance of this institution becomes clear if we keep in 
mind that the owner alienated his existence in property; it was more important to him than [il 
y tient plus qu’à] life itself; it goes beyond the strict limits of a mortal lifetime, it lives on 
after the body is gone, an earthly and tangible incarnation of the immortal soul.110 
Woman’s being remains heterogeneous. This helps makes sense of Beauvoir’s reference to 
man as a woman’s god.111 In this history, it originally was the god or totem (the religious 
sovereign) which unified the group. This function was gradually transferred to the chief (the 
political sovereign) and then to man (the individual sovereign). This makes sense too of 
Beauvoir’s claim that the condition of women serves man’s ontological ambitions:112 it is by 
enforcing unity upon his domain – and so upon woman – that the male becomes sovereign. 
Woman remains lost in nature and the group. Because of this ‘it is in woman that the 
whole of foreign Nature is concentrated;’113 woman becomes ‘the perfect intermediary 
between nature that is foreign to man and the peer who is identical to him’.114 It is this 
understanding of the differing being of men and woman that informs the first chapter of 
‘Myths’, a section described by Bauer as ‘long and exceptionally elliptical and dense [but] 
pivotal to understanding Beauvoir’s appropriation of the master-slave dialectic’.115 I want to 
add the presence of Bataille/Hegel to readings which till now have been dominated by 
Kojève/Hegel. 
Bataille does not privilege consciousness: his analysis of beings is apropos of all 
complex beings: bee-hives, the state/leviathan, the human being, and so on. For Bataille the 
desire for Being, the desire to be All, is common to all beings because lack is common to all. 
This lack gives Beauvoir a sense of ‘otherness’ which is not anthropological but which is 
represented in woman; that is, there are ways of understanding Beauvoir’s use of ‘otherness’ 
which are not understood in terms of the slave’s transcendent but dependent consciousness 
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(i.e. the master-slave dichotomy). Nor are they other-as-object (i.e. the subject-object 
dichotomy). They are not-this in a holist or organicist sense, in an absolute sense (i.e. the 
particular-universal dichotomy): Beauvoir equates this sense of other with nature understood 
in the terms of a Hegelian Nature/Spirit binary;116 it is also associated with ‘the All’.117 Man 
is in constant struggle against this other: 
Man’s life is never plenitude and rest, it is lack and movement, it is combat. Facing himself, 
man encounters Nature; he has hold of it, he tries to appropriate it for himself. But it cannot 
satisfy him. Either it realizes itself as a purely abstract opposition [...] or else it passively 
submits to man’s desire and allows itself to be assimilated by him [...] he possesses it only in 
consuming it, that is, in destroying it. In both cases, he remains alone.118  
As Bauer points out ‘the idea of ceaseless struggle is not a part of [Hegel’s] 
Phenomenology:’119 in terms of the master-slave dialectic struggle is only present in the fight 
to death and is not ongoing. But constant struggle is a feature of Bataille’s ontology and 
Nature understood as the totality of Being – the All – is the adversary (not another 
consciousness). Beauvoir’s use of Bataille is similar to her use of Kojève/Hegel insofar as she 
uses Bataille to analyze the relationship between men and woman: by evoking the 
traditional/mythical equation of woman with Nature, Beauvoir shows that woman becomes 
the representation of the All against which man is ceaselessly and hopelessly pitted: ‘[Man] 
would like himself to be as necessary as pure Idea, as One, All, absolute Spirit;’120 ‘[Woman] 
is man’s prey; she is his downfall, she is everything he is not and wants to have, his negation 
and his raison d’être’.121 In one sense this makes woman everything, but again Beauvoir uses 
Bataille’s idea that to be everything is to be nothing: woman becomes absolute Other. She is 
All and Nothing. 
[Woman is] mother Earth as a face of darkness: she is chaos where everything comes from 
and must return one day; she is Nothingness [Néant] [...] Man wants to assert his individual 
existence and proudly rest on his ‘essential difference’, but he also wants to break the barriers 
of the self and commingle with water, earth, night, Nothingness [Néant], with the Whole 
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[Tout]. Woman who condemns man to finitude also enables him to surpass his own limits: 
and that is where the equivocal magic surrounding her comes from.122 
This mythological equation of woman with Nature allows particular women to fulfill the role 
of mediator to Nature.123 For Bataille, only when seduced – specifically he means a viral man 
responding to desirable female nudity – ‘can [the individual] find the plenitude of a total 
existence’.124 And so for Beauvoir, beyond her being other-as-object, this is the significance 
of woman’s being possessed in the ‘flesh’.125 In her flesh woman instantiates Nature and is 
the site of man’s futile struggle with that All. 
Beauvoir is a philosophical eclectic and this understanding of woman as other works 
in parallel with an understanding in terms of consciousness; ‘man seeks the Other in woman 
as in Nature and as his peer’.126 This is the source of woman’s very particular ambiguity: 
‘through the Other I accede to the Whole, but it separates me from the Whole; it is the door to 
infinity and the measure of my finitude. And this is why woman embodies no set concept [...] 
However she is considered, it is this ambivalence that is most striking’.127 The close of the 
chapter is worth quoting at length:  
That is why woman has a double and deceptive image [décevant visage]: she is everything he 
craves and everything he does not attain. She is the wise mediator between auspicious Nature 
and man; and she is the temptation of nature, untamed against all reason. She is the carnal 
embodiment of all moral values and their opposite, from good to bad; she is the stuff of action 
and its obstacle, man’s grasp on the world and his failure; as such she is the source of all 
man’s reflection on his existence and all expression he gave of it; however she works to divert 
him from himself, to make him sink into silence and death. As his servant and companion, 
man expects her also to be his public and his judge, to confirm him in his being; but she 
opposes him with her indifference, even with her mockery and her laughter [mais elle le 
conteste par son indifférence, voire ses moqueries et ses rires]. He projects on to her what he 
desires and fears, what he loves and what he hates. And [if] it is difficult to say anything 
about her, it is because man seeks himself entirely in her and because she is All [Tout]. But 
she is All in that which is inessential: she is wholly the Other [Autre]. And as other she is 
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other than herself, other than what is expected of her. Being all, she is never exactly this that 
she should be; she is everlasting disappointment [déception], the very disappointment 
[déception] of existence that never successfully attains or reconciles itself with the totality of 
existents.128 
I want to make the scope of my claim clear. I am not arguing that Bataille’s general 
ontology is Beauvoir’s; Beauvoir, against Bataille, does distinguish between conscious beings 
and other composite beings: there are far too many tensions between Bataille’s ontology and 
the broader phenomenological tradition in which Beauvoir is so deeply engaged for this not 
to be the case.129 Rather I am arguing that Beauvoir is using or appropriating Bataille’s 
heterology just as it has been shown she is using Kojève’s master-slave dialectic; she is 
adopting concepts she finds useful in serving her analysis of the place of women in 
contemporary society. Recall his description of woman as taboo which for Bataille is both a 
source of both attraction and repulsion.130 
Doubtless, the sexual parts are not truly repugnant unless they belong to a person devoid of 
charm – a fat old woman, for example. But the most desirable woman’s organs partake in the 
unspeakable nature of the organs of the woman who is old and obese. Thus they partake in the 
nature of the sacred nucleus; which is even less surprising, because, as I have mentioned, this 
nucleus refers to, among other taboo horrors, menstrual blood.131 
Beauvoir, in what is another example of what Michèle Le Doeuff has described vis-à-vis 
Sartre as her ‘operative philosophy’, appropriates Bataille’s egregiously misogynistic thought 
and develops it into her own.132 Without reading her as failing to differentiate human beings 
from any composite being, if we allow her to share with Bataille the idea that human beings 
are never singular but are only more-or-less autonomous (her subject is essentially ambiguous 
after all), we may also allow her the idea that woman’s being is simply more heterogeneous 
than men’s. 
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This interpretation is supported by Beauvoir’s descriptions of embodied sexual 
difference and women’s lived experience. In a use of the notions of alienation and the unified 
male subject which parallel the historical and mythological sections of The Second Sex, 
Beauvoir argues that in childhood it is alienation to the unified object of the penis – here 
playing a role analogous to the totem – which allows a young boy to bodily assume his 
subjectivity, ‘the very object in which he alienates himself becomes a symbol of autonomy, 
transcendence, and power’.133 By comparison the young girl is anatomically opaque to 
herself and so ‘cannot incarnate herself in any part of her own body’.134 This provides the 
link between Beauvoir’s ontological understandings of the condition of woman and her 
biological understanding of the woman’s body. ‘A woman’s body – and specifically the girl’s 
– is a “hysterical” body in the sense that there is, so to speak, no distance between psychic 
life and its physiological realization’.135 This is part of the significance for Beauvoir of 
woman’s experience of a disunified and porous body particularly as it is experienced in 
pregnancy and in menstruation. And famously Beauvoir makes much out of the fact that the 
woman is penetrated in heterosexual sex: in the sexual act, ‘the man’s body remains intact 
[...] the woman is penetrated and impregnated, and this always constitutes a kind of rape’.136  
Man’s sex organ is neat and simple, like a finger; it can be innocently exhibited, and boys 
often show it off to their friends proudly and defiantly; the feminine sex organ is mysterious 
to the woman herself, hidden, tormented, mucous, and humid; it bleeds each month, it is 
sometimes soiled with bodily fluids [d'humeurs], it has a secret and dangerous life.137 
After the sexual act, a woman struggles with the demands of her body ‘cleaning herself as a 
dirty vase, while man reclines in bed in his superb wholeness [superbe intégrité]’.138 These 
descriptions of the female body are problematical and have been much criticized.139 But this 
ontology allows Beauvoir to write in positive terms of a woman’s desire for erotic union with 
her lover, a desire which is a not feature of male sexuality at least insofar as it is 
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characterized by integrity and unity.140 And these descriptions need to be read to in light of 
Beauvoir’s celebration of ontological ambiguity which she made explicit in the Ethics. Here 
too there is thematic continuity with Bataille for whom ‘two beings of the opposite sex are 
lost in one another and together form a new being different from either […] Love expresses a 
need for sacrifice: Each unity must lose itself in some other that exceeds it’.141 Finally, the 
heterogeneous being of woman is for Beauvoir linked to her experience of sexual pleasure 
itself. This passage of The Second Sex is famous: 
Male pleasure soars [Le plaisir mâle monte en flèche]; when it reaches a certain threshold it 
fulfils itself and dies abruptly in organism; the structure of the sexual act is finite and 
discontinuous. Feminine pleasure radiates through the whole body; it is not always centered 
in the genital system; vaginal contractions then even more than a true orgasm constitute a 
system of undulations that rhythmically arise, subside, re-form reach for some instants a 
paroxysm, then blur and dissolve without ever completely dying. Because no fixed goal is 
assigned to it [Du fait qu’aucun terme fixe ne lui est assigné], pleasure aims at infinity: 
nervous or cardiac fatigue or psychical satiety often limit the woman’s erotic possibilities 
rather than precise satisfaction; even fully fulfilled, even exhausted, she is never totally 
relieved [délivrée].142 
The translation of ‘terme’ as ‘goal’ here inclines this passage towards a reading in terms of 
intentionality and goal-oriented action. But the French need not have this meaning: a ‘terme’ 
is a limit or end in either a spatial or temporal (read: ontological) sense. Where male pleasure 
is finite, feminine sexual pleasure is unbounded and aims at the All. Recall that the erotic in 
Bataille is privileged because it is the experience of heterogeneity: in the erotic the subject 
breaks its boundaries and loses its coherence and this is why for Bataille eroticism is the 
assenting to life ‘up to the point of death’.143  
Where recent scholarship has focused on Beauvoir’s phenomenology of sexual 
difference in terms of a tradition of the phenomenology of the body which leads from Husserl 
to Merleau-Ponty, I would like to suggest in closing that there are resources here for adding 
to this an understanding of sexual difference in terms of heterological being.144 
                                                 
140 See for example TSS, 410. 
141 Bataille ‘The College of Sociology’ in The College of Sociology (1937-39), ed. Denis Hollier, 337. See also: 
Bataille ‘The Sorcerer’s Apprentice’ in The College of Sociology (1937-39), ed. Denis Hollier, 19-20; Bataille 
‘Attraction and Repulsion I’, 107-112.  
142 TSS, 409-10; LDS, 179-180. 
143 Bataille, Erotism: Death and Sensuality, 11. See also p239. 
144 Heinämaa, Towards a Phenomenoloogy of Sexual Difference: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir. 
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Notwithstanding much work, it has recently been argued that Beauvoir scholarship is 
at an impasse that, still bound by some of her own comments, scholars continue to read 
Beauvoir in Sartre’s shadow.145 I have in this paper added Bataille to the list of Beauvoir’s 
significant interlocutors, a move which produces useful effects for the understanding of 
Beauvoir’s oeuvre. In doing so I do not seek to diminish her independence as a philosopher, 
rather I have attempted to ‘read Beauvoir such as she is’.146 Beauvoir is a synthetic 
philosopher, an eclectic in the proper sense of the term; she draws on a wide philosophical 
erudition appropriating others’ thought but always to serve her own original purpose. I have 
shown that Beauvoir’s relationship to Hegel is more complex and sophisticated than most 
commentators have so far suggested, largely because it is not sufficient to read her 
Hegelianism only in terms of Kojève’s master-slave dialectic. Exegesis is not complete, but I 
have shown that we ought to take Beauvoir’s appropriation of Bataille seriously if we are to 
understanding her response to Hegel. 
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